In voting problems where agents have well behaved (Lipschitz continuous) utility functions on a multidimensional space of alternatives, a voting rule is threshold strategy-proof if any agent can only obtain a limited utility gain by not voting for a most preferred alternative, given that the number of agents is large enough. For anonymous voting rules it is shown that this condition is not only implied by but in fact equivalent to the influence of any single agent reducing to zero as the number of agents grows. If there are at least five agents, the mean rule (taking the average vote) is shown to be the unique anonymous and unanimous voting rule that meets a lower bound with respect to the number of agents needed to obtain threshold strategy-proofness. JEL Classification numbers: D72, D71.
Introduction
A voting mechanism for public goods is strategy-proof if no voter can gain by not voting according to his true preference. There are good reasons to use strategy-proof voting mechanisms, the main one being that the final decision will be based on the right information. Unfortunately, in general a high price has to be paid in order to attain strategy-proofness. In the classical model of social choice studied by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) this price is dictatoriality of the mechanism, and in the classical literature on demand revealing public good provision (Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973 ) the price is budget imbalance. Better results are obtained if the domains of preferences as well as alternatives are restricted. Moulin (1980) considers single-peaked preferences on the real line and characterizes a class of generalized median mechanisms. However, in a multi-dimensional Euclidean space with singlepeaked preferences, a mechanism is dictatorial if it is strategy-proof and the range of the mechanism is at least two-dimensional (Zhou, 1991) . Even in these cases, rather natural mechanisms like taking the average vote, are excluded by strategy-proofness.
In the present paper we question the compellingness of the strategyproofness condition based on the following considerations. First of all, if a mechanism is not strategy-proof, it may yet be difficult and risky for any single agent to try to manipulate the final outcome by insincere voting if he does not exactly know the preferences of the other agents. Moreover, even if he does know these preferences he would have to take into account potential manipulation by the other agents. Second and additional, even if some gain is to be reached by manipulation, this will generally be rather small if there are many agents, and it will not outweigh the cost of finding out the best way to manipulate. For these reasons it seems safe to assume that especially in larger voting problems agents will not be interested in manipulation, even if there is a theoretical potential for gain. Indeed, political scientists do not tend to be particularly interested in strategic aspects of voting systems.
The present paper is an attempt to formalize these considerations. A global summary of our main findings is as follows. In our framework, voting mechanisms that are 'competitive' in the sense that any single voter has negligible influence, are shown to be hardly manipulable. This is obvious and intuitive. More interestingly, for anonymous mechanisms (which is the usual case) also the converse holds: Limited strategic manipulability must imply competitiveness of the voting mechanism. Taking the average vote turns out to be the unique anonymous and unanimous mechanism that satisfies limited strategic manipulability in a sharp sense, i.e., for the minimum number of agents.
In somewhat more detail, we will assume a framework where agents have continuous preferences on some Euclidean space, which may represent different aspects of the political spectrum. Limited strategic manipulability is modeled by the condition of threshold strategy-proofness on a voting mechanism or rule. This condition means that, given that there are sufficiently many agents, no agent can gain more than a small amount in utility by not reporting a best point. This unavoidably raises the question how to measure utility gains. This is not possible in a purely ordinal framework, and in fact we will impose a condition of Lipschitz continuity on the utility functions representing the preferences. It should be noted that no single-peakedness condition will be imposed, which makes our model also in this respect different from Moulin (1980) and Zhou (1991) .
As announced above, the first main result of the paper is that for anonymous voting rules threshold strategy-proofness is equivalent to a condition saying that, as the number of agents becomes large, the influence of any single agent on the outcome of the voting rule reduces to zero. Next, for a large class of voting rules a sharp lower bound on the number of agents will be derived in order that the maximal utility gain by manipulation is limited. The second main result is that, if there are at least five agents, then anonymity, unanimity, and this sharp lower bound characterize the mean rule (taking the average of the votes). In other words, the number of agents needed to make a voting rule 'almost' (threshold) strategy-proof is minimal in case of the mean rule.
Both results confirm plausible intuitions. The first result not only establishes that strategic manipulation issues vanish if each single voter has a negligible influence, as is the case in large voting problems. More importantly, it says that this negligible influence is a necessary condition in order to avoid strategic manipulation. Note that this result is not obvious: for instance, generalized medians in the one-dimensional case with single-peaked preferences are strategy-proof but do not entail negligable influence of individuals. The second result says that a natural rule like the mean rule seems the best one to use if manipulation biases should only be small.
As far as we are aware the literature on this particular theme is rather limited. Gary-Bobo and Jaaidane (2000) show that in a growing consumer population it is possible to have a revelation mechanism for the production of public goods that is strategy-proof, budget balanced, and approximately efficient. The following references concern private goods. Roberts and Postlewaite (1976) show that in an exchange economy the gain from not announcing one's competitive demand goes to zero as the number of consumers increases through replication. Gul and Postlewaite (1992) derive that in an exchange economy with asymmetric information the tension between incentive compatibility and efficiency disappears as the agents are sufficiently replicated. Córdoba and Hammond (1998) show that in a class of smooth random exchange economies there are mechanisms that are nonmanipulable in the limit with probability one. Though in a different (private goods) context, these results are similar in spirit to ours. Schummer (1999) considers a condition of -dominance of truth-telling in a two-person exchange economy without, however, increasing the number of agents. Section 2 gives the formal model and a preliminary result. Section 3 characterizes anonymous and threshold strategy-proof voting rules, and Section 4 characterizes the mean rule in terms of sharp threshold strategy-proofness. The more technical proofs are collected in Section 5.
Preliminaries
The set of alternatives is the m-dimensional Euclidean space IR m . A point of IR m can be interpreted as the location of a public decision, or of a political party, in an election with respect to m attributes, or political viewpoints.
Preferences are represented by utility functions u :
Here, without loss of generality we take · to be the Euclidean norm. The number L is called a Lipschitz constant and U L is the set of all utility functions with Lipschitz constant L. Lipschitz continuity in this context can be interpreted, roughly, as the requirement that utility functions do not exhibit fast changes.
For a compact set C ⊆ IR m , an alternative x ∈ C is a best alternative of a utility function u in C if u(x) ≥ u(y) for all y ∈ C. Since u is Lipschitz continuous and C compact, a best alternative always exists.
The set of (potential) agents is identified with the set of natural numbers For a set of agents N ∈ P and an agent i ∈ N , the profiles p, q are called i-deviations if p(j) = q(j) for all j ∈ N \{i}. The central property under investigation in this paper is the following.
, every L > 0, and every > 0, there is a real number k > 0 such that for every N ∈ P with |N | ≥ k, every i ∈ N , all i-deviations p, q ∈ C N , and every utility function u ∈ U L for which p(i) is a best alternative in C, we have:
Threshold strategy-proofness says the following. Suppose that votes are restricted to a compact subset and utility functions are Lipschitz continuous. Then, given that there are sufficiently many agents, an agent cannot gain more than a small amount by voting for a possibly suboptimal alternative. In other words, under these conditions it is hardly worthwhile to try manipulation by strategic voting. The usual strategy-proofness condition would require the inequality in the definition to hold for = 0. Hence, threshold strategy-proofness is a relaxation of strategy-proofness. The following lemma shows an important consequence of threshold strategy-proofness: by manipulation, either the resulting alternative remains approximately the same, or the manipulating agent is almost a dictator with respect to the votes under comparison. This result will be used frequently in the sequel.
Lemma 1 Let F be a threshold strategy-proof voting rule and let C, L, , and k be as in Definition 1. Let N ∈ P be a set of agents with |N | ≥ k, let i ∈ N , and let p, q ∈ C
. By threshold strategyproofness and the definition of u,
The remaining statement in the lemma follows by symmetry. P
Anonymity and threshold strategy-proofness
In this section we characterize all anonymous and threshold strategy-proof voting rules. Let • denote composition of maps. 
In other words, a voting rule is anonymous if the identities of the agents do not matter.
Definition 3 A voting rule F is insensitive at large populations if for every > 0 and every compact set C ⊆ IR m there is a real number k such that for every N ∈ P with |N | ≥ k, every i ∈ N , and all i-deviations p, q ∈ C N we have:
Thus, if a voting rule is insensitive at large populations, the influence of a single agent becomes small as the number of agents becomes large. Since by Lipschitz continuity small changes in the alternatives can lead to only small changes in utility, the condition implies threshold strategy-proofness. Formally:
Proposition 1 Let F be a voting rule that is insensitive at large populations. Then F is threshold strategy-proof.
Proof. Let C be a compact subset of IR m and let > 0. Let L > 0 and choose k ∈ IR such that for every N ∈ P with |N | ≥ k, every i ∈ N and
Consequently, for such profiles and for u ∈ U L , it follows that
Hence, F is threshold strategy-proof. P
The converse of Proposition 1 does not hold. For instance, a dictatorial rule, assigning to any profile of votes the same agent's reported point, is threshold strategy-proof but not insensitive at large populations. Under anonymity, however, the two conditions are equivalent.
Theorem 1 An anonymous voting rule is threshold strategy-proof if and only if it is insensitive at large populations.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section 5. The if-part (in fact, Proposition 1) states the intuitive and obvious fact that, if the influence of a single agent vanishes as the population of voters becomes large, then so does his potential for strategic manipulation. The only-if part is more interesting and more difficult to prove: if the voting rule is anonymous and the possibility for strategic manipulation vanishes as the population grows, then any single agent's influence must vanish at all. Observe that median rules (Moulin, 1980) are anonymous but not insensitive at large populations: for those rules there always exist situations where a single agent's vote may have a tremendous influence on the public outcome. Consequently, these rules also violate threshold strategy-proofness (that is, outside of the single-peaked domain).
Sharp bounds and the mean rule
In this section we first derive a lower bound for the number of agents in order that for a given voting rule each agent can gain at most by manipulation. In other words, we establish a lower bound for the number k as in the definition of threshold strategy-proofness. This will be done for voting rules that are anonymous and translation invariant. A proof of this lemma is given in Section 5.
The remainder of the section is devoted to the study of voting rules that meet the lower bound derived in Lemma 2. This will result in a characterization of the mean rule. First, we formalize this condition.
Definition 5 A voting rule F is sharp threshold strategy-proof if for every compact subset
, and all utility functions u ∈ U L for which p(i) is a best alternative on C, we have:
An example of a sharp threshold strategy-proof voting rule is the mean rule 
It turns out that, basically, the mean rule is the unique sharp threshold strategy-proof voting rule of interest. The following theorem makes this statement precise. A voting rule F is unanimous if F (a, . . . , a) = a for every a ∈ IR m .
Theorem 2 Let F be a unanimous, anonymous and sharp threshold strategyproof voting rule. Then F is equal to the mean rule for all profiles with at least five agents.
A proof of this theorem can be found in Section 5.
Theorem 2 does not hold for less than four agents. Let m = 1 and let F be the mean rule in case the number of agents is four or more. For three agents, let F assign to every profile p the point 
with all inequalities strict whenever p, q 
For t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} we now prove that 
Since by case t = 0 we have
As F (w
− b < 2λ, and a − b ≥ 5λ, the first inequality in (4) Cases t = 2, . . . , n − 1 are analogous to case t = 1. Hence, we have proved (2). 
). So F is not anonymous. P Proof of Theorem 1. In view of Proposition 1 it is sufficient to prove the only-if part. Suppose that F is threshold strategy-proof but not insensitive at large populations. Then it is sufficient to prove that F is not anonymous. Since F is not insensitive at large populations there is a δ > 0 and a compact subset C of IR m such that for every k > 0 there is a set of agents N with |N | ≥ k and a j ∈ N and j-deviations v, w ∈ (C ) 
Take k (as in the second paragraph of the proof) equal to k, and let N , j, v, and w as in the second paragraph. Note that (1) in Lemma 3 is satisfied. So by this lemma, letting v play the role of r, it is sufficient to prove that
where, analogously to r x in Lemma 3, v x is the j-deviation of v with v(j) = x. By (6) we have: 
, and u by u(x) = min{u (x), u (a)}. (This construction is similar as in the proof of Lemma 1.) Note that, by anonymity, p and q can be regarded as 1-deviations. We have
where the inequality follows from threshold strategy-proofness, the first equality from F (p) = F (q) + (b − a)/k and u(F (p)) = 0, and the third equality 
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that 
For v = p and w = q and noting that p(j) = a and q(j) = b, we have by (7), (8) applied for x = a, and (9) applied for y = b: It follows that
By repeated application of Lemma 4,
It follows that these inequalities must be equalities, and in particular
This completes the proof of the induction step and of the theorem. P
